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The problem setting
How do we establish singular causal claims? It seems we do this all the time, from courtrooms to cloud chambers. Nevertheless, there is a strong lobby in the evidence-based medicine and policy movements that argues that we cannot make reliable causal judgments about single cases in these areas. So we cannot tell whether a policy or treatment 'worked' for any specific individual. The reason often seems rooted in the idea that a singular causal claim, if not equivalent to, at least implies, a counterfactual claim: c caused e  e would not have occurred had c not occurred.
1 Couple this with the idea that we cannot have compelling evidence about what would have happened in any actual case had things been different and you end up with serious doubts about the possibility of warranting singular causal claims.
There are obvious problems with this line of thought. First, we all know familiar counterexamples to the simple unadorned implication from singular causal claim to counterfactual.
Second, there are reasons to think we can have compelling evidence about what would have happened if things had been different in specific ways, for instance by warranting a universal law that implies that -e will be always be consequent on -c. Third, on standard accounts of how positive randomized-controlled-trial (RCT) results can legitimate causal conclusions, what gets established is a result about causal relations in single individuals: at least some individuals in the treatment group were caused by the treatment to improve. But the RCT is the gold standard in evidence-based policy and medicine, and among the very folks who object that we cannot establish singular causal claims in various health and social policy domains. I suppose then that the thought is that although we can establish causal claims about single individuals, these are what we might call anonymous claims: c caused e in somebody (we know not whom). The worry is whether we can have compelling evidence about individualized claims: c caused e in this specific individual.
This worry matters when it comes to evaluating policies and treatments. Practitioners can have very strong feelings that a treatment they employed for a particular individual was the cause of improvement in that individual where the treatment is not the kind of intervention 1 This idea is widespread not just in the evidence-based medicine and policy movements but also among philosophers. Tim Maudlin (2002, 143) for instance claims that, "When we think we know a cause of some event,
we typically assent to the corresponding Hume counterfactual", where the 'Hume counterfactual' corresponding to the claim that c caused e is simply the counterfactual 'e would not have occurred had c not occurred'.
2 that can be tested in an RCT, nor that we have well established theories about that allow us to conclude that it should work for individuals like this one. It seems equally unsatisfactory simply to dismiss the practitioners' views as it is just to go along with them. Nor do we need to, I shall argue here. I shall do so by providing a catalogue of kinds of evidence that are often available that can speak in favour of singular causal claims, and do so without routing through a counterfactual on the way.
Some categories of evidence for 'c caused e in individual j'
The first distinction that can help provide a useful categorisation for types of evidence for singular causal claims to draw is that between direct and indirect evidence:
• Direct: Evidence that looks at aspects of the putative causal relationship itself to see if it holds.
• Indirect: Evidence that looks at features outside the putative causal relationship that bear on the existence of this relationship.
Indirect. The prominent kind of indirect evidence is evidence that helps eliminate alterna- It is important to make a simple point at the start. I aim to lay out a catalogue of kinds of evidence that---if true---can speak for or against singular causal claims. How compelling that evidence is will depend on:
• how strong the link, if any, is between the evidence and the conclusion,
• how sure we can be about the strength of this link,
• how warranted we are in taking the evidence claim to be true.
All three of these are hostages to ignorance… which is always the case when we try to draw conclusions from our evidence. In any particular case we may not be all that sure about the other factors that need to be in place to forge a strong link between our evidence claim and • Presence of required support factors (other factors without which the cause could not be expected to produce this effect): The emetic was swallowed before too much poison was absorbed from the stomach.
• Presence of necessary intermediate step: I vomited.
• Presence of symptoms of the putative causes acting to produce the effect: There was much poison in the vomit, which is a clear side effect of the emetic's being responsible for my survival.
• Characteristics of the effect: The amount of poison in the vomit was measured and compared with the amount I had consumed. I suffered just the effects of remaining amount of poison; and the timing of the effect and size were just right.
What makes these evidence?
A catalogue is important. It drives home the point that there is a good variety of different kinds of evidence that we may be able to establish in particular cases that can speak for individualised singular causal claims. I arrived at these by looking across disciplines and practic- 6 conditions represented by a term a ji x i to the effect x j . They also allow for the representation of the way the different terms each of which is sufficient for the production of some contribution to x j interact to determine the value of x j .
Structural equations are used in discussions of both singular causation and generic causation.
In the latter case they represent general causal principles or what are sometimes called 'causal laws'. For me the difference is negligible since I take generic causal claims to be claims about individuals in a particular population. But our topic here is singular causation. In using a structural equations framework in this context, I shall suppose that outcomes in a given individual are fixed by a set of causal principles true of that individual and that these principles can be expressed in a set of equations like those above, where the effect is on the left and the causes for that individual of that effect are on the right. It is assumed that,
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Causal Principles:
1. The causal relation is irreflexive (nothing causes itself),
the causal relation is asymmetric (if a causes b, b does not cause a),
3. causes occur temporally before their effects, 4. there is a principle that holds for every effect at every time, 5. the principles satisfy a kind of transitivity requirement: for any cause X that appears in a principle, substituting a full set of causes of X for X in that principle yields a true principle, 5 and 6. any true relations that hold among quantities appearing in the causal principles, are guaranteed to hold given the truth of the relations described in the causal principles. Because of CP1., CP2. and CP3., a set of equations meant to represent causal principles will take the familiar block triangle form of my sample set. It is important to note that 1-6 constrain the notion of a causal principle but will not generally pick out a unique set of equations.
4 Note that these are necessary conditions, not sufficient.
5 It should be noted that this does not imply the more contentious claim that singular causal claims are transitive. See below for further discussion.
6 So, consider, e.g., a cause c with two effects, e 1 and e 2 . Supposing determinism, e 1 obtains iff e 2 obtains. That is not among the causal principles. But it obtains on account of the causal principles.
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To my mind this is not amiss because causal notions are not reducible to non-causal notions;
any attempt to characterise one causal concept will involve mention of other equally causal concepts. For instance, 1-6 can pick out a unique set of principles if 6 were to be replaced by 6': any true relations that hold among quantities appearing in the causal principles, hold on account of (or 'because of' or 'are generated by') the relations described in the causal principles. But the 'on account of' relation in 6' is hardly more transparent than the concept of causal principle I am trying to explicate.
Then to connect equations and principles we make the canonical assumption that the equations are right when they represent the right principles. So,
Causal correctness for structural equations:
A causal structural equation set is correct for individual iff each equation represents a true causal principle that holds for that individual.
The point of the equations is that the factors represented could take different values---I might or might not take the poison, might or might not take the emetic, might or might not survive.
They represent all the different arrangements of these values that are possible for the individual. So they imply counterfactuals. There are two different attitudes to the connection between the equations and the counterfactuals.
Judea Pearl (2000) , and I, and various others take the equations as basic: they represent the principles that 'nature' or the underlying physical or psychological or social structure sets. I also take the notion of causation represented in 'c=' as primitive. I explicate this primitive notion of causation by describing constraints on the equations, like the ones I laid out. Also, as I construe causation, principles like these usually depend on some underlying system that gives rise to them and that we can use to explicate them. In nice cases we can even derive the principles from facts about the underlying system, its parts and what they do in interaction, as when we derive Kepler's laws from the structure of the planetary system and Newton's theory. I call these underlying systems, nomological machines; philosophers of biology subsequently called them mechanisms. All of that helps give meaning to the equations and the general principles governing individuals that these equations represent. The counterfactuals for any individual then fall out from the causal principles that hold for the individual. Where a claim of the form 'c caused e in individual j' has a determinate truth value, a causal structural framework applies. That requires that there is a set of equations that hold for j that have the characteristics implied by CP1.--CP6.
We can read 'hold for' here in either of the two senses I described. We can suppose, as I do, that a set of equations is correct if it represents correctly a set of causal principles that obtain for j. Or we can see a set of equations, as Hitchcock does, as a convenient summary of a vast network of certain kinds of counterfactuals about j and j's situation.
The equation-based assumption is clear in the work of those who use a causal structural equations framework to treat singular causal claims. Hitchcock, as I have noted, uses these equations to analyse singular causal claims even though he grounds the truth of these claims in a network of counterfactuals and eschews the principles that I take the equations to represent.
My suspicion is that detailed investigation would reveal that many other counterfactual accounts, as well as many manipulation accounts, will also be committed to causal structural Let me make two remarks here. First, insofar as the truth conditions specified above do not require that the occurrence of e counterfactually depend in any way on that of c, the account I offer is impervious to cases of redundant causation (e.g. overdetermination or preemption) that create trouble for counterfactual approaches because they are cases in which e does not counterfactually depend on c and yet, our intuitions seem to tell us, c causes e. 9 And since (i)
claims of the form 'o caused e in j'---where o is an omission---are typically assumed to have determinate truth values and (ii) omissions can be INUS conditions, whether the account given above allows for omissions to be causes will depend on whether there is any equation of the form 'e c= ao' representing a true causal principle holding for j in the relevant set of causal structural equations. In other words, issues regarding the causal status of omissions arise upstream from the account of singular causation given above. They arise, so to speak, at the stage at which the true causal principles that hold for j are laid out.
The second remark is a reminder that causation is what I, after Otto Neurath, call a Ballung concept (See e.g. Cartwright et al. 1996, Part 3 or Cartwright and Runhardt, 2015) : A concept made up of a congestion of ideas, with boundaries that are not clearly and unequivocally delineated. Different aspects of the concept will be stressed and different boundaries will be drawn in different ways depending on the use to which the concept is put and on the context in which it is put to use. My concern here is not to provide an account of singular causation that is faithful to our intuitions in a handful of test cases. Rather I aim to offer a characterisation that serves a different set of related ends: First, it makes more precise our Ballung concept of causation in a way that can be useful in a variety of scientific and policy settings; second, we can catalogue a variety of kinds of evidence about whether the singular causal relation as thus characterised obtains; and third, we can make it clear why the facts we take to be evidence for singular causal claims as characterised are in fact evidence for such claims.
I do not claim that this is the only nor the best way of making the concept of singular causation more precise. To the contrary. I would argue that there is no one right way to do it, and that is because our ordinary concept is a Ballung concept. It is not precise by its very nature.
But sometimes, as in science and often in policy, we need a precise concept. Different ways of making it more precise will allow it to do different jobs in different contexts. Perhaps we can develop a concept more useful for many of the contexts I have in mind by refining what I propose here or even taking a very different tack. What matters is that the concept we develop be able to do the job we require of it AND that we stick with the sense characterised throughout. It is no good gathering positive evidence using a method that is good for evidencing singular claims as made precise in one way and then drawing inferences that are licensed by some other sense. That is to do science by pun.
With the concept as characterised by the truth conditions above, it is apparent why the five types of evidence in our catalogue are indeed evidence for the claim 'c caused e in individual j'. I can illustrate with our emetic example.
In the emetic example, the principles that fix what happens in the specific situation I was in yesterday when I swallowed the poison will look like this: vomitings at times t(1), t(2) and t(3), respectively, to unspecified causes other than taking the emetic. Notice that 6. follows by substitution of 2. into 5 using the rule Peter Menzies (2012) calls "composition" in his use of structural causal equations. 10 Writing it down does not commit me to assuming transitivity of singular causal facts in general; it just is the case in this case that 6. is true.
Here I have recorded only a small sample of the causal principles I take to be true in this case.
I have added some principles that were not called into play to illustrate my point about 3) Presence of intermediate stages.
a) The violent vomiting at t(2) is, as we can see from equations 2. and 5. a necessary condition for m to cause h at t(4).
4) Symptoms of causality a) We see from 3. and 6. that the emetic is the cause of the degree of health actually experienced at t(4) if and only if it is the amount of poison in the vomit at t(5) is p, the amount actually measured.
10 Though Menzies does not explicitly define it, 'composition' is the rule that permits the substitution of the causes x 1 , …, x n of some effect y to y itself in the right-hand side of any structural equation in which y appears.
14 5) Elimination of alternatives. 
How do we know the equations?
Grounding the types of evidence in structural equations shows us that there is a link and gives an indication of how strong it is. So how sure we can be of this link depends on how sure we are of the equations. And perhaps that's the killer. Maybe we know nothing at all about how this kind of effect could be produced by this cause or any other. Then we won't be able to appeal to the kinds of evidence I have proposed. But we are often in a better position and sometimes in a far better one. We have a theory about the principle, perhaps a general theory, perhaps one very local to this case. Sometimes the theory is already well-supported and can get independent support in this case (and some of this support can come from knowledge about the underlying system that gives rise to the principles we postulate). Sometimes this will be easier because we don't need the theory to be very precise. My emetic example is a case in point.
Finally, getting a lot of positive evidence of these various types will help confirm both the theory and the singular claim at once by the hypothetico-deductive method. My theory says if I swallow the emetic and vomit violently, that will cause me to get better. I do swallow the emetic and I do vomit violently and I do get better. The theory also tells me this should happen if, but only, if I have absorbed just a small amount of poison by the time of vomiting.
Those are things the theory tells me to expect and so when they occur, they speak in favour of the theory. How strongly? That is a good question. But this is a standard problem for the hypothetico-deductive method, not one peculiar to cases of singular causation. If our worry is that I got better after this but perhaps not on account of this, the sequencing, the timing, the size of effect, the presence of auxiliary factors, the absence of auxiliaries for other causes hypothesised by the theory all contribute to the case for both the theory and the singular claim.
But clearly no amount of positive consequences of our hypotheses will clinch the hypotheses for us. Again, that is just the usual situation that we have learned to live with, sometimes well and sometimes not. I offer a strategy in the middle. I have outlined a concept of single-case causation and catalogued a number of kinds of evidence we can have directly about the single case itself to warrant this kind of causal claim about it. I have also pointed out that our warrant for taking any of these as evidence in a particular case will depend on how secure we can be about the related hypotheses about how the case is governed. Our hypotheses teach us how the cause should be expected to produce its effect in this case; our evidence speaks to whether matters have indeed proceeded in the way to be expected. So the strategy I offer is not useful in cases where we know nothing about how the putative cause should produce its effect and are in no position to propose plausible hypotheses with enough detail to tell us enough about what to expect. But then, how often are we in that unfortunate position?
